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I. INTRODUCTION
When the federal courts began supervising the desegregation of public
schools in the latter half of the twentieth century, no one intended this
regulation to continue for an indefinite period of time. The expectation was
that the courts would return schools to local control after the districts had
complied with their federal desegregation orders. In the year 2001,
however, over 400 school districts were still under federal court
supervision,1 making the federal bench the largest school district in the
country. Since many of these school districts have operated under court
supervision for more than three decades, the reason that they are still under
court supervision is not that they have failed to desegregate. Instead, at least
two plausible explanations demonstrate why so many districts remain under
desegregation orders. One explanation results from the unclear standard the
Supreme Court has developed to define when courts should release school
districts from supervision. The other explanation arises from the process
school systems must undergo to regain local control.
First, the Supreme Court has not provided the lower courts with any
concrete standards to help them decide when they should release school
districts from supervision. The Court has only vaguely explained that lower
courts should remove school districts from court orders when the districts
1. Edward Blum & Roger Clegg, Pyrrhic Victory, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 29,
2001, at 6.
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have attained "unitary status." 2 It has then listed six educational areas,
commonly known as the Green factors,3 from which school districts must
eliminate all vestiges of the prior dual system before the districts can return
to local control. The Court has not offered any more guidance on this
question. Therefore, lower courts have developed their own measures, and
this fact explains why some school districts are still under court control,
even though they have achieved a higher level of desegregation than other
districts that courts have already released from supervision.
Second, the process that the courts have developed to determine when
to release districts from their desegregation orders has made it possible for
school systems to remain under supervision indefinitely. Typically when a
school district first came under supervision, the court required the district to
develop an acceptable desegregation plan. In many cases, if the district did
not design a satisfactory plan, the court developed its own plan. The court
then removed the case from its active docket and did not continue to
monitor the district's progress unless an outside party brought a problem to
the court's attention. Consequently, if no party brought any complaints to
the court, a school district could remain under supervision years after it had
achieved its desegregation goals.
Theoretically, under this process, a school system should not remain
under supervision after it has fulfilled its desegregation obligations because
even if no other party reactivates the litigation, the school system itself has
the power to request that the court release it from control. However, school
systems have several motives to want to remain under court orders
indefinitely, and so the potential exists for a system to remain under
supervision many years after it has fully desegregated its schools. Aside
from the fact that this prolonged supervision violates the principle that
schools should be under local control, it also often works to the detriment of
students in the system.
Consequently, this Note argues that the Supreme Court should have
more clearly defined the term "unitary status." Since the Court offered little
clarification on this point, several commentators have attempted to suggest
more quantifiable methods to assess when a system has achieved unitary
status. This Note analyzes these proposals and explains why these
suggestions are all problematic.
This Note then offers a new proposal for how the Court could have
defined unitary status. Unlike the proposals of some scholars that attempt to
offer substantive definitions of some of the Green factors, this proposal
focuses on providing procedural clarification. This proposal, called the
"twelve-year plan," asserts that a court should end supervision of a system
2. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
3. Id.
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under a desegregation order twelve years after it has removed the case from
its active docket if the district has complied with the order while under
supervision. During this twelve-year period, the court would more closely
monitor the school system's compliance by requiring annual reports from
the system detailing its progress in remedying the vestiges of the prior dual
system.
The selection of the twelve-year period of court supervision is not
arbitrary. Instead, it stems from the fact that a school system has
substantially harmed all students who attended segregated schools under the
prior dual regime. Consequently, the twelve-year plan requires a school to
remain under court supervision until all of the students who had standing in
the desegregation suit have a chance to graduate.
The twelve-year plan is a superior alternative to the status quo because
it addresses the four main problems that stem from the current system. First,
inflexible desegregation orders restrict the ability of districts to adopt
creative policies to address their most current and pressing needs. Second,
school districts must spend thousands of dollars in litigation fees to have the
courts release them from supervision. Third, parents have no clear
expectation as to when the courts will remove desegregation orders and
their children will have to switch schools. Finally, the longer that districts
are under desegregation orders, the more difficult it becomes to ensure that
the districts are only addressing de jure segregation and have not adopted
policies that focus on de facto segregation.
In response to this first concern, the twelve-year plan recognizes that
school districts need the freedom to implement policies to address changing
needs instead of being hindered by requirements that they meet rigid racial
ratios long after the district has addressed, to the extent possible, the evils
caused by de jure segregation. The twelve-year plan combats the second
problem concerning the high costs of litigation in several ways. It ensures
that courts are more involved in monitoring a school system's progress and
in preventing noncompliance, and it also provides a concrete time frame for
when supervision should end. These attributes of the plan would prevent the
need for the costly litigation that plagues the current system. Similarly, the
twelve-year plan solves the problem of parental expectations, because it
gives individuals a concrete idea of when their schools' assignment plans
will change. Finally, the limited timespan recommended by the twelve-year
plan would minimize the extent to which school districts under
desegregation orders feel that they are required to address imbalances that
result from de facto segregation.
The problems that result from the Court's vague unitary status
standards and the benefits the twelve-year plan would create become
evident through a case study of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System
(CMS). In 1971, CMS became the first school system to use busing to
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desegregate its schools when the Supreme Court approved the use of this
desegregation method in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education . The courts then failed to monitor CMS's desegregation
progress any further until a group of parents asked a federal judge to end
the court order in 1997. 5 The school system waged an active defense
against the plaintiffs' suit, claiming that it had failed to comply with the
court order. After years of litigation, a federal court of appeals finally
concluded that CMS had obtained unitary status.
6
An examination of the CMS litigation clearly illustrates the four
problems that result when school systems remain under court supervision
for too long. Furthermore, a hypothetical analysis of how circumstances
would have been different for CMS if the court had facilitated the system's
desegregation through the twelve-year plan illustrates the merits of this
proposal. Finally, an assessment of the steps CMS has taken since the court
removed it from supervision helps dispel some of the main concerns that
might surround the use of the twelve-year plan.
Part II of this Note begins by providing a synopsis of the limited
guidance that the Supreme Court has given to lower courts concerning how
to determine whether a school has achieved unitary status. It then addresses
various measures lower courts have developed in light of this ambiguous
guidance. Part III analyzes the few suggestions that scholars have offered to
quantify the concept of unitary status and articulates the flaws in these
proposals. It also introduces the twelve-year plan, this author's suggestion
for how unitary status could have been more clearly defined. This Part
identifies the plan's strengths and addresses potential criticisms that might
arise concerning the feasibility of the proposal. Part IV explains why a
clearer definition of unitary status is necessary by detailing the history of
CMS's actions to comply with its desegregation order. It applies the twelve-
year plan to the facts of the CMS litigation, and it demonstrates how this
plan could have prevented the problems that the school system's parents
and students faced as a result of the courts having allowed CMS to remain
under the court order for too long. Part V uses the CMS desegregation
experience both to identify other concerns the twelve-year plan may
generate and to demonstrate why these concerns are unfounded. Part VI
concludes.
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4. 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971).
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2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
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I. THE VAGUE DEFINITION OF UNITARY STATUS
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[flrom the very first, federal
supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to
remedy past discrimination. ' The Court has given little guidance, however,
as to when lower courts should release schools from the court orders
requiring them to execute desegregation plans. In its 1968 decision in
Green v. County School Board, the Supreme Court stated that courts should
remove schools from supervision when the schools achieve "unitary status,"
or when "racial discrimination [has been] eliminated root and branch."8 The
Court further clarified that schools would not achieve unitary status until
six aspects of education no longer reflected any of the vestiges of past racial
discrimination. These areas, now commonly called the Green factors, are
student assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities,
and facilities. 9 Yet, the Court offered no further guidance to lower courts
concerning how to determine when a Green factor no longer reflects the
vestiges of past racial discrimination.
Later in Board of Education v. Dowell, the Court explained that unitary
status is achieved if "the Board had complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree since it was entered" and "the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable."'10 However,
the concept of "to the extent practicable" is just as unclear as the concept of
"unitary status."
It is perhaps understandable why the Supreme Court did not offer the
lower courts more direction. After all, every school district is under a
different district court order detailing the expectations the school district
must meet in order to achieve unitary status. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has openly acknowledged that it has not offered a concrete definition
for the concept of unitary status because it did not believe that it needed to
explicate further this term.1 "[T]hink[ing] it [was] a mistake to treat words
such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if they were actually found in the
Constitution," the Court has explained that it was "not sure how useful it
[was] to define these terms more precisely."12 However, despite the Court's
reasoning, the Fourteenth Amendment articulates the constitutional right to
equal protection that unitary school systems promote and dual systems
violate. Also, ironically, since the Court has basically limited its guidance
concerning when lower courts should release schools from supervision to
7. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991).
8. 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
9. Id. at 435,
10. 498 U.S. at 249-50.
11. Id. at 245-46.
12. Id.
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the use of the term "unitary status," the lower courts have overemphasized
this term and given it great importance, even though it appears that this
outcome was not the Court's intention.
As a result, district and circuit courts have developed different and
somewhat arbitrary criteria to measure when school districts have
eliminated the vestiges of prior discrimination. In Morgan v. Nucci, the
First Circuit looked to the racial imbalance in schools during the period that
a district was under a desegregation order to determine whether the school
district had achieved unitary status in school assignments. 13 In Hoots v.
Pennsylvania, a district court not only considered whether specific schools
had achieved acceptable racial ratios, but also whether individual
classrooms had a satisfactory racial balance, before ruling that the school
district had achieved unitary status.
14
Courts have also developed a variety of different measurements
concerning the other five Green factors. When evaluating whether school
districts had achieved unitary status concerning faculty and staff
assignments, one court considered whether the district's current
employment practices were nondiscriminatory and whether the district had
remedied the effects of prior discrimination. 15 Another court found that the
increase in the number of African-American principals in the district was an
important consideration when determining that the school district had
achieved unitary status.'
6
Outside of the measures that specifically relate to the Green factors,
courts have recognized a myriad of other ancillary factors as important
considerations when determining whether school districts have achieved
unitary status. For instance, some courts have found that the presence of
minority members in school administration is a helpful indicator of a
district's progress. 17 In addition, at least one court has considered the
support for desegregation demonstrated by local African-American and
white communities as an indicative measure.' 8 This court took particular
note of the fact that the community as a whole had "accepted public school
desegregation in a spirit of cooperation and good will,"' 9 and recognized
that the community had demonstrated a willingness to sustain the newly
desegregated school by supporting a school bond.z°
13. 831 F.2d 313, 320-21 (1st Cir. 1987).
14. 118 F. Supp. 2d 577, 585 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
15. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stafford, 651 F.2d 1133, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).
16. Whittenberg v. Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 289, 299 (D.S.C. 1985).
17. Riddick v. Sch. Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 528 (4th Cit. 1986); see also Morgan, 831 F.2d at 321.
18. United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336, 1339-40 (N.D.
Miss. 1976).
19. Id. at 1339.
20. Id. at 1340.
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Equally absent from the Supreme Court's opinions concerning
desegregation orders is any clarification concerning how many years a
school district must comply with a desegregation order before a court will
release the school from its supervision. In Board of Education v. Dowell,
the Court explained that courts should release school districts from
desegregation orders after the districts have complied with the orders for "a
reasonable period of time.
' 21
However, the Court has failed to offer more concrete guidance on this
point. Consequently, the district and circuit courts have developed a number
of different standards for how many years that a school district must
comply with the desegregation order for the court to find that it has
achieved unitary status. For example, at least one appellate court has
asserted a vague opinion on this question, stating that courts can release
school districts from supervision after the districts have complied with the
desegregation orders for a period of "several years.
' 22
Other courts have offered more specific opinions. One Mississippi
district court released a school district from its desegregation order after the
district had complied with the order for seven years.23 Another district court
in Oklahoma removed a school district from supervision after it had met the
requirements of the desegregation plan for only five years.24 Accordingly,
across the country, the standard for the duration of a desegregation order
has varied by school district.
This analysis of how courts have attempted to measure a school
district's progress toward achieving unitary status demonstrates one of the
main problems inherent in the current jurisprudence concerning unitary
status. Under the present regime, courts have developed their
methodologies for evaluating compliance with a desegregation order ex
post instead of when the desegregation order was first implemented.
Consequently, school districts have had little notice about how courts will
evaluate their progress, and furthermore they lack a clear idea of when they
might be eligible for release from court supervision. This lack of
information is problematic in a system that places the burden on the school
district or some other outside party to request that the court remove the
desegregation order. It is consequently not surprising that many school
systems remain under court orders long after they have complied with them.
21. 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
22. NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.12 (11 th Cir. 1985).
23. Corinth, 414 F. Supp. at 1337.
24. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 241 (discussing a 1977 court order finding compliance with and
dissolving the 1972 school desegregation program).
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I1. A PROPOSED CLEARER DEFINITION OF UNITARY STATUS
An examination of the vague jurisprudence concerning unitary status
has identified the problems inherent in the current system. School systems
have no clear idea of when courts will release them from court supervision.
Consequently, they often remain under court supervision for too long.
These characteristics of the current system are problematic for a number of
reasons. First, schools that are under desegregation orders for several
decades lack the ability and incentive to adopt creative new policies to
address the system's most pressing needs. 25 A school system's needs
change over time, and in the twenty-first century many black parents no
longer believe that an integrated education will ensure that their children
26receive the best quality education. As Professor Drew Days has noted,
many blacks have begun to rethink the integrative ideal because of
"[c]oncems about the burdens blacks have had to carry in the desegregation
process, the degree to which integration requires assimilation and rejection
of black values and institutions, and the seemingly intractable problems
presented for largely black school systems in educational extremis."
27
However, if the school is still under a desegregation order, the district's top
priority when designing school policies is to ensure that it is in compliance
with the order.
Secondly, schools that are under desegregation orders typically have to
spend thousands of dollars in litigation fees when they seek termination of
court supervision.2 8 In addition, when a school is under a desegregation
order, parents typically have no idea when the court will remove the order,
25. See, e.g., Joel B. Teitelbaum, Comment, Issues in School Desegregation: The Dissolution
ofa Well-Intentioned Mandate, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 347, 367 (1995) (explaining that "[tihe special
legal obligations under which these districts operate could potentially interfere with the competing
goal[] of school reform" and that the possibility for conflict between these two goals exists for
political and structural reasons, as well as the fact that schools under desegregation orders operate
under special limitations).
26. Davison M. Douglas, Swann Song for the Busing Era, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 1, 2 (1999); see
also Drew S. Days III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV.
53, 55 (1992) (noting that "given the initial hope that desegregation would increase the quality of
educational opportunity for black students," it is disappointing that "the desegregation process has
not necessarily brought about improvements"). While this Note acknowledges that integration is
no longer the greatest concern of many parents with regard to educational reform, this Note
strongly affirms that integration is an important and necessary goal for school systems after courts
have removed their desegregation orders. Consequently, Part V discusses a number of ways
school systems can still achieve integration when they are no longer under court supervision.
27. Days, supra note 26, at 74.
28. Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains,
Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759, 769 (1993) (noting that the DeKalb County School System
had already spent more than one million dollars in litigation fees before participating in arguments
on remand from the Supreme Court to achieve a declaration of unitary status and acknowledging
the high costs of dismantling desegregation decrees in general).
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at which time their children may have to transfer schools.29 It is important
for parents to have a reasonable expectation of when their child's student
assignment may change because school changes have psychological
impacts on children and often create logistical problems for parents.
Finally, when schools remain under desegregation orders for prolonged
periods of time, they begin to address racial imbalances caused by de facto
segregation as well as de jure segregation.3 ° When a school district is under
a desegregation order for several decades, racial imbalances in schools can
begin to occur because of population shifts and demographic changes.
Since the system is under the order, the school district has to make
adjustments to its student-assignment plan to remain in compliance with the
order. The courts, however, only intended for schools under desegregation
orders to address de jure segregation, not imbalances that occur due to de
facto segregation. 3 1 Recognizing the harmful effects of the vague nature of
the unitary status concept raises the important question of how this term
could be more clearly defined.
A. Scholars' Suggestions for How To Define Unitary Status
Various observers have attempted to suggest more tangible and
quantifiable ways to measure a school system's progress toward achieving
unitary status. Yet, these ideas run into roadblocks. For instance, one
measure that has been suggested is that a district is unitary when there is no
29. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (detailing the uncertainty that parents in the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System faced while awaiting the end of the litigation to determine
whether the system was unitary).
30. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.D (discussing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System's
attempts to address de facto segregation while under its court desegregation order).
31. In Swann, the Court established the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation,
making clear that only dc jure segregation was unconstitutional. See Teitelbaum, supra note 25, at
354-55 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971)).
Furthermore, the Court made clear that "[n]either school authorities nor district courts are
constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student
bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system." Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32; see also Keyes
v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (reaffirming that a constitutional violation does not
exist unless a school district has engaged in de jure segregation, evidenced by the intent to
segregate).
There are scholars who have disagreed with the Court's decision to limit unconstitutional
segregation to only de jure segregation. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, School Desegregation: The
Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 19, 39 (1974) (advocating that society
"abandon the illusory search for the incidents of past discrimination" and recognize a distributive
conception of the remedy for segregation because desegregated schools are a normative right); see
also Steven 1. Locke, Comment, Board of Education v. Dowell: A Look at the New Phase in
Desegregation Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 537, 560 (1992) (arguing that instead of distinguishing
between de jure and de facto segregation, courts should consider residential segregation a vestige
of past de jure segregation). This Note does not seek to enter this debate between the courts and
desegregation scholars. Instead, it simply attempts to create a clearer definition of unitary status
within the Court's interpretation of what actions constitute unconstitutional segregation.
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longer a possibility that it can achieve any further racial balancing.32 In
theory, however, there is always some new policy a school district could
implement to desegregate further its schools. Consequently, school systems
under this definition of unitary status could remain under desegregation
orders forever. At least one court has recognized the problem inherent in
this idea and has held that a court cannot keep a school under a
desegregation order simply because more desegregation is theoretically
possible.
33
Another suggestion concerning how to define unitary status is that
school systems have achieved this goal "when the numbers are right."
34
Professor Melva Ware has defined this concept to mean that a system
complies with a court desegregation order when test scores reflect that any
continuing discrepancies between the success of African-American and
white students are "incidental."35 Courts could measure whether these
quantifiable indicators are "incidental" by comparing a school district's test
scores with state and national averages.36 This measure is problematic,
however, because different areas of the country are wealthier than others,
and different states have different methods of financing and running their
schools, which might create discrepancies that have nothing to do with
remnants of a prior dual system. Furthermore, the Supreme Court made
clear in Missouri v. Jenkins II that the appropriate test of whether a district
has achieved partial unitary status is not whether student achievement levels
reach national norms.
37
On the other hand, Charles Willie and Michael Fultz have advanced a
different test to evaluate unitary status based on a study they conducted that
analyzed four school systems they believed had developed successful
models.38 Their study found that one mistake school systems and courts
have commonly made when designing desegregation plans is that they only
39focus on providing a desegregated educational experience for one race.
32. See Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 255 (W.D.N.C.
1999), aff'd sub nom. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001)
(en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
33. Calhoun v. Cook, 525 F.2d 1203, 1203 (5th Cir 1975).
34. See Melva L, Ware, School Desegregation in the New Millennium. The Racial Balance
Standard Is an Inadequate Approach to Achieving Equality in Education, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REv. 465, 479 (1999).
35. Id. at 478.
36. Id.
37. Cheryl Feutz, The Supreme Court's Reanalysis of School Desegregation Remedial
Decrees: Is the Majority Placing Subtle Limits on the Trial Court's Vast Equitable Discretion?,
61 Mo. L. REv. 679, 682 (1996) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins II, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995)).
38. Charles Vert Willie & Michael Fultz, Comparative Analysis of Model School
Desegregation Plans, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT WORK 197, 197-200 (Charles
Vert Willie ed., 1984) (analyzing data collected in the Boston, Milwaukee, Seattle, and Atlanta
school systems).
39. Id. at 197-98.
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For instance, many systems have concentrated on ensuring that African-
American students attend schools where they are not the majority-
however, these desegregation plans have left many predominantly white
schools.40 Willie and Fultz argue that to be truly effective, desegregation
plans must ensure that the system does not operate any schools where racial
minorities comprise less than twenty percent of the student body.4 1 Their
survey demonstrated that school systems that have been the most successful
in desegregating their schools focus on the twin goals of increasing
educational advancement and improving racial diversity for all students.42
The strength of Willie and Fultz's plan is that they identify that one
necessary component of a successful plan to achieve unitary status is to set
forth quantifiable requirements that school systems must meet to ensure that
their students are receiving an integrated education. However, their
suggestions do not consider the question of how long school districts must
remain under court supervision and the harms that result when school
districts operate under court orders for too long. Consequently, their plan
does not consider many of the problems that result from the system
currently in place.
Finally, Thomas Chandler has proposed that courts should engage in
two levels of hearings to determine whether schools have achieved unitary
status.43 Under his plan, the school board would have to request the first
hearing after it had operated under its desegregation plan for a period of
years. The burden of proof would be on the school board to prove that it
had eliminated the effects of the prior dual system. If the court found that
the system had not achieved unitary status, the court would have to give the
system specific instruction on how to comply further with the desegregation
order.44
After the court has found that a system is unitary, Chandler
recommends that the court retain jurisdiction over the system for a fixed
length of time that each individual court would determine. During this time,
the district would have to submit periodic reports to the court detailing the
continued racial balance maintained within the system.45 At the end of the
specified period, the court would then hold another hearing where it would
give the original plaintiffs one final opportunity to show why the district
should remain under supervision. Then, if there was no showing that the
40. Id. at 198.
41. Id. at 202-03.
42. Id. at 198.
43. Thomas E. Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation and the Finding
of Unitary Status, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 519, 553 (1987).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 554.
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school should remain under the desegregation order, the court would
relinquish all control over the school district.46
In actuality, Chandler's plan is not very different from the status quo.
His main contribution is adding the second stage of hearings, which would
require school systems to remain under court orders even after being
declared unitary. One benefit that this second hearing might provide is that
parents would have some notice as to when their child's school assignment
would change, since the court has to specify the length of time between the
initial unitary status finding and the second hearing that would remove the
district from court supervision.
Chandler's plan, however, suffers from a number of weaknesses. First,
his plan requires the school board to initiate the proceedings to be released
from the court order. The problem with this requirement is that school
districts often are motivated to remain under court orders indefinitely.
Evidence demonstrates that several school districts have fought to remain
under court supervision even though these districts recognized that there
was nothing more they could do to comply with the court order. For
instance, one school system has attempted to remain under court
supervision so that it could continue to use race-based student assignments
to its magnet schools, which would be unconstitutional if the court lifted the
desegregation order.4 7 In this instance, if the court had allowed the school
system to remain under the court order, it would essentially have given the
system a mandate to engage in the unconstitutional practice of using race-
based preferences for magnet school admissions even though the system
had already done everything practicable to eliminate the vestiges of the
prior dual system.
48
In addition, there are other motivations for school districts to want to
remain under supervision even after they have complied with their court
orders. For example, schools may want to remain under court orders
indefinitely so that they can continue to receive certain state and federal
funds that they can no longer obtain when they have achieved unitary
status.4 9 Furthermore, many school boards want to preserve the court orders
46. Id. at 555.
47. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.D (discussing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System's
fight to remain under court supervision after it had complied fully with its desegregation order).
48. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.D.
49. When testifying before Congress, Alfred Lindseth, an attorney with extensive experience
representing school systems seeking unitary status, stated that a number of school systems do not
wish for the courts to release them from supervision, because they do not want to lose their court-
ordered funding. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 262 n.41 (1999)
(citing Assessing the Impact of Judicial Taxation on Local Communities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1996 WL 538968 (1996) (statement of Alfred A. Lindseth)). Several examples of
school systems that Lindseth cited were St. Louis and Kansas City, and he suggested that school
districts in other states such as Illinois and Georgia had also joined plaintiffs in resisting a finding
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because they believe there is a benefit to maintaining a racially balanced
staff at each school. 50 However, they fear that if the court order is removed
they will be under increasing pressure, often from leaders in the African-
American community, to replace their current staffing policies with a "role
model" policy.5 This new type of policy would assign teachers and
principals disproportionately to match the predominant race at each school.
As a result, school systems might not ever initiate the proceedings for
courts to remove them from supervision, even though being released from
the court order might be in the best interest of their students.
Another problem with Chandler's plan is that the court would only give
the school system feedback on its progress toward achieving unitary status
ex post. Therefore, school systems might operate under court supervision
for years without recognizing that they are violating the court order. Last,
one other troublesome component is that the plan recommends that the
school system remain under court supervision for a period of time even
after the court has made a finding that the district has achieved unitary
status. This provision of the plan strongly conflicts with the mandate that
schools should return to local control as quickly as possible.
B. The Twelve- Year Plan
None of the plans offered by other scholars attempt to specify the
length of time that school systems must operate under desegregation orders
prior to achieving unitary status. As a result, these plans do not address the
problems that result when school systems remain under court orders for too
long. At least one scholar has recognized the problems inherent in this
ambiguous procedure. Chris Hansen has noted:
Courts, which by their nature are used to finite projects with a
definite beginning and a certain, usually prompt end, are
increasingly uncomfortable with school desegregation, which
appears to have no end. Courts, which by their nature are used to
success when decisions are issued and then executed, are
increasingly frustrated by their inability to achieve success ... in
these cases. Simply put, they are giving up.
52
Consequently, the key to defining unitary status more clearly is to
develop a concrete procedure for school systems and courts to follow that
that they had achieved unitary status in order to continue to receive funding. Id.; see also DAVID J.
ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 215 (1995).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving Up? Current Issues in School Desegregation, 42
EMORY L.J. 863, 864 (1993).
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specifies the length of time the system has to comply with its court order
and that requires more accountability during the supervision period. In most
school desegregation cases, the district court developed the court order, and
it took the schools a few years to change their policies in order to satisfy the
court. Then the court removed the case from its docket until some outside
party chose to reintroduce the matter, which could take several decades.
In light of the problems that plague the current system, this Note argues
that court supervision should end in all cases twelve years after the court
has removed the case from its docket, as long as the district has maintained
its level of compliance during that time. The twelve-year time period would
begin on the date that the school system has fully begun to implement its
court-approved desegregation plan. During these twelve years, all of the
students who were in grades K-12 in the segregated school system would
have the opportunity to graduate, and the court desegregation order would
truly be remedial. This approach accords with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Swann and Keyes,5 3 as it focuses on the victims of the de jure
segregation in question.
The selection of a mandated twelve-year period of supervision is
supported by a study conducted by Robert Crain and Rita Mahard. This
study revealed that "desegregation beginning in first grade or kindergarten
and continuing through later years produced much better results in terms of
achievement gains than desegregation beginning at higher grade levels. 54
Consequently, it seems that a desegregation order could not remedy the
effects of the prior dual system to the extent practicable unless it remained
in place until the students in kindergarten the year before the plan's
implementation had graduated from high school.
The twelve-year plan would also require the courts to maintain a closer
watch on the district's compliance with the desegregation order while the
schools are under supervision. 55 Admittedly, the courts do not have the time
or money to micromanage every decision that a school district makes with
regard to its desegregation plans. However, the school system could submit
annual reports to the court detailing its desegregation progress and giving
an account of how it is addressing all of the Green factors. Furthermore, the
system would have to explain any activities that deviate from the
desegregation plan and its rationale for any major decisions, such as where
it is building new schools. It does not help anyone for a court to notify a
school district that a school-siting decision is segregative ten years after the
district has made the decision. These reports would address this problem.
53. See supra note 31.
54. Orfield & Thronson, supra note 28, at 778.
55. Wendy Parker has also argued that judges should be more actively involved in monitoring
the progress of school systems in desegregating their schools. Wendy Parker, The Future of
School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1157, 1161, 1210-20 (2000).
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At the end of this twelve-year period, the court would release the school
district from its supervision and give control back to the local boards.
To assist the courts with the monitoring required by this proposal, the
twelve-year plan would insist that from the beginning, the court and school
system work together to develop a detailed outline of the court's
expectations regarding each of the Green factors. For all of these factors,
the court would set forth quantifiable measurements to assess the school
system's compliance and would explain the rationale behind these
measurements. Certainly, no two school systems are the same, so it would
be difficult to develop uniform quantifiable measurements for each Green
factor that would apply to every school system. It is possible, however, for
each court to determine first its individual goals for each Green factor.
Then it can determine quantifiable ways to measure these goals based on an
analysis of what is feasible for each individual school system. For instance,
to assess compliance with the Green factor of student assignment, a court
might accept Willie and Fultz's recommendation that a school system
ensure that none of its schools has a student body comprised of less than a
certain percentage of racial minorities. However, Willie and Fultz's
suggestion of twenty percent might not be appropriate for every school
system because no school system has the same demographic makeup as
another. Therefore, the court could develop a standard for each school
system based upon its demographics and the underlying goal that all
students receive the benefit of an integrated education.
One positive result of having the court develop standards to measure a
district's compliance with each Green factor ex ante is that when the court
later has to analyze a school system's annual report, the court has a set of
indicators to use when evaluating the system's progress. Another benefit of
this requirement is that it ensures that, from the beginning, the school
system has a reasonable expectation of what the court requires from it
concerning its compliance with the desegregation order. The current regime
is fundamentally unfair in this respect because school systems often do not
have a clear conception of the courts' expectations until they have operated
under the court order for a number of years, and a suit has been brought to
request a finding of unitary status.
Admittedly, one problem with developing quantitative standards
concerning the Green factors ex ante is that the court might not have a clear
idea of what is truly possible for a school system to achieve. Consequently,
at least during the first few years of supervision, some degree of flexibility
would have to be built into the system to allow for some small deviations
that the district may make from these concrete standards. When analyzing
any deviations reported in a system's annual report, the court would hold
the system to the same good faith standard that courts currently use when
analyzing a district's actions to comply with a desegregation order. In
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addition, the court would have the ability to modify the expectations at any
time during the twelve-year period, as it gained more information about
what the school system is capable of achieving with regard to becoming
unitary.
One question that arises concerning the twelve-year plan is what courts
should do if they find that the school system has adopted new segregative
policies during this time. Certainly the courts would require the system to
change such practices immediately. The more important question, however,
is whether the twelve-year period should start again upon this
determination. In deciding whether to restart the twelve-year count, the
court should examine evidence concerning the school system's intent when
it adopted these segregative practices. If it appears the school system was
making a good faith effort to comply with the desegregation order, and
these policies resulted because they were either the only practicable choice
available5 6 or because of an honest mistake,57 the court should not restart
the count. However, if there is evidence that the system was not making a
good faith effort to comply with the court order when it adopted these
policies, then the court should restart the twelve-year count.
1. Benefits of the Twelve-Year Plan
The twelve-year plan provides many benefits that the status quo does
not offer. Most importantly, the twelve-year plan counteracts the four main
problems that result when courts maintain supervision over school districts
under desegregation orders for prolonged periods of time. First, these
school systems often become complacent and lack both the ability and the
incentive to change their policies to focus on their students' greatest needs..
The twelve-year plan, however, would limit the duration of the
desegregation order, so that at the end of the twelve-year period, school
districts would have the opportunity to determine what is the best way to
ensure that all students continue to receive a quality education.
Second, when schools currently want the courts to release them from
supervision, they typically have to spend thousands of dollars in litigation
fees to achieve this goal. Under the twelve-year plan, however, the court
would release the district at the end of this specified time period.
Furthermore, the court would have monitored the district's progress during
this time and notified the district if it had committed an infraction.
56. An example of such an unavoidable choice would be the school system's decision to
construct a new school in a wealthy, predominantly white neighborhood because this land was the
only suitable property available, even though the majority of the system's schools were already
located in white neighborhoods.
57. For instance, it is possible that a system might make a mistake in developing either its
student- or faculty-assignment plan that creates a significant racial imbalance at one of its schools.
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Admittedly, this more extensive monitoring would cause the school system
and the courts to incur additional costs. It is much easier, however, for the
system to argue that a specific act has not violated the desegregation order
than to argue that it has achieved unitary status in all capacities.
In addition, another problem with the current system is that it does not
provide parents with a reasonable expectation of when the court will
remove the desegregation order, which may cause their children's
assignment plans to change. Under the twelve-year plan, parents would
have a clear idea of when the student assignments based on the
desegregation order would end. One problem with both the current system
and the twelve-year plan is the unfairness of making students transfer from
one school to another while they are in the middle of their tenure at that
school. For instance, a tenth-grade student should not have to transfer to a
new school to finish high school. Consequently, under the twelve-year plan,
it is highly advisable to allow students to complete the highest grade
available at the school they are currently attending when the desegregation
order ends.
Also, when schools remain under desegregation orders for prolonged
periods of time, they begin to address racial imbalances caused by de facto
segregation as well as de jure segregation. The twelve-year plan would curb
this problem 58 by limiting the duration of desegregation orders. Finally,
from a political standpoint, one final benefit of the twelve-year plan is that
it takes much of the pressure off of local school boards, which are typically
elected. The twelve-year plan predetermines the time frame of the
desegregation order, so school boards do not have to worry about the
political ramifications of requesting that the court remove the district from
supervision. Furthermore, with the court providing more extensive
oversight throughout the entire process, school boards would have less
incentive to consider political repercussions when making decisions that
affect the Green factors.
2. Potential Criticisms of the Twelve-Year Plan and Responses
While the benefits of the twelve-year plan are clear, there are five main
criticisms of the plan that could be raised. The most obvious is the question
of whether twelve years is long enough for a school district to remedy the
harms caused by the prior de jure segregation. For example, Gary Orfield
and David Thronson argue that in many past unitary status hearings, courts
have removed desegregation orders before school districts have effectuated
58. On why addressing de facto segregation under federal court orders is a problem, see infra
text following note 61.
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true change. 59 They further assert that negative ramifications occur when
courts declare school systems unitary before the systems have remedied
their past violations. 60 Their main concern, however, stems from the belief
that as soon as a school system is released from court supervision it will
become resegregated due to residential segregation.6'
Orfield and Thronson lose sight of the fact that desegregation orders
were not intended to address de facto segregation. Consequently, while it is
problematic that some schools become resegregated after courts remove
desegregation orders, federal desegregation orders are not the appropriate
solution to this problem. Instead, new solutions must be developed to
address this issue. If we admit that no practical solutions exist to remedy
residential segregation, then this concession would mean that school
districts would have to remain under desegregation orders forever.
Moreover, a court should seriously scrutinize any proposed
desegregation plan that could not achieve desegregation in twelve years,
and force the school district to make adjustments to it. This scrutiny alone
would be more helpful than the status quo because currently many school
districts simply remain stagnant under their desegregation orders. They do
not make any changes to effectuate further desegregation, and they force
their students to suffer the negative consequences of remaining under
desegregation orders for too long.
Furthermore, the policy arguments that critics such as Orfield and
Thronson raise to justify prolonged court supervision as necessary to
prevent resegregation do not account for the harms that result when schools
remain under court orders for too long. In fact, a close analysis of these
policy arguments demonstrates that none of them justifies the continuation
of court supervision over public schools for a prolonged period of time.
First, some critics who oppose the discontinuation of court supervision
assert that once schools are released from their desegregation orders, the
achievement gap between white students and black students will increase.
Consequently, the only way to ensure that the gap continues to close is to
continue to operate schools under the desegregation plans that ensure a
balanced makeup of the student body.62 However, extensive studies by
leading social science and school desegregation expert David Armor
59. See Orfield & Thronson, supra note 28, at 759-60.
60. See id. at 761. This Note agrees with Orfield and Thronson's argument that resegregation
within the public schools creates many problems. It argues, however, that there are a number of
ways to address these concerns even after courts release schools from supervision. See infra Part
V.
61. Id. at 771 (criticizing a federal court for not considering "changing birth rates, the pattern
of white suburbanization that existed long before the busing plan, or the large declines in white
enrollment that took place in other similar central cities with neighborhood schools" when
dismantling a court desegregation order).
62. See David Armor, The End of School Desegregation and the Achievement Gap, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 629,637 (2001).
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demonstrate that, at present, there is no evidence that schools that are still
under desegregation orders are diminishing the achievement gap between
black and white students.63 While the achievement gap did decrease slightly
when desegregation was implemented on a wide scale in the 1970s, the gap
has begun to increase since the late 1980s, even though desegregation has
not been dismantled to a significant degree.64 Armor notes that since 1986,
white students' math scores on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) tests have continued to rise while the scores of black
students have remained constant. 65 Similarly, after 1988, an analysis of
these test scores shows that the reading scores of white students have risen,
while the test scores of black students have declined. Most persuasive is
Armor's conclusion that, at present, black students in schools under court
orders achieve at the same rates as black students attending de facto
segregated schools.
66
Secondly, these critics assert that ending the court orders will be
detrimental to students, because resegregation will ensure that students will
be forced to learn in single-race environments.67 On the other hand, when
students attend desegregated schools they have the opportunity to work
together and learn from one another as well as gain an appreciation for the
cultural pluralism of American society. 68 In the same vein, these critics
argue that schools that are integrated "require[] parents of all races to work
together to improve the educational quality of a common school. By
compelling blacks and whites to cooperate in facing joint problems on a
local level, school integration presents invaluable opportunities for the
exercise of interracial cooperation and the discovery of convergent
interests.
' 69
However, these arguments lack adequate support for a number of
reasons. For instance, in many schools still under court orders, racially
segregated classes have still been created through practices such as
tracking, which divides students into classes by their perceived ability.7"
These practices make it difficult for students to have meaningful
63. Id at 642 (stating that "unlike the time of Brown, there is no reasonable way that school
segregation can be invoked as a primary cause of this achievement gap, nor is there any credible
evidence that school desegregation-in the form of racial balancing-has diminished the gap to
any important degree").
64. Id. at 632, 635.
65. Id. at 632.
66. Id. at 653.
67. See Mark V. Tushnet, The "We've Done Enough" Theory of School Desegregation, 39
HOW. L.J. 767, 771 (1996).
68. Book Note, The Desegregation Dilemma, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1144, 1148 (1996)
(reviewing ARMOR, supra note 49).
69. Id.
70. Jack W. Londen, School Desegregation and Tracking: A Dual System Within Schools, 29
U.S.F. L. REV. 705, 710 (1995) (arguing that "[t]racking is of particular concern in school districts
that are under desegregation remedial orders").
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interactions with individuals of other races while at school.7' Furthermore,
research has shown that as desegregation continues, fewer and fewer white
students remain in the public schools due both to demographic reasons and
white flight.7' This fact further decreases the possibility that students in
desegregated schools will be exposed to students of a different race.
In addition, while in theory desegregated schools teach an appreciation
for cultural diversity, studies have shown the opposite to be true. Armor has
noted:
One of the central sociological hypotheses in the integration policy
model is that integration should reduce racial stereotypes, increase
tolerance, and generally improve race relations. Needless to say, we
were quite surprised when our data failed to verify this axiom. Our
surprise was increased substantially when we discovered that, in
fact, the converse appears to be true. The data suggests that, under
the circumstances obtaining in these studies, integration heightens
racial identity and consciousness, enhances ideologies that promote
racial segregation, and reduces opportunities for actual contact
between the races.
73
Also, while it is laudable to hope that parents of different races will have
the opportunity to interact as they work for the benefit of their children's
school, in actuality, desegregation has actually led to an overall decline in
parental involvement at schools under court orders.
74
The other main argument that scholars raise to oppose the perceived
premature release of schools from court orders is the concern that after the
desegregation orders end, schools with a majority of black students will not
receive adequate funding and without this financial support, these schools
will not produce desirable educational outcomes. 75 For instance, Orfield and
Thronson argue that nonjudicial mechanisms cannot ensure that districts
achieve equity among their resegregated schools.76 However, even if this
unfortunate result occurred, ending the desegregation orders would not
foreclose the opportunity for concerned parents to litigate this matter.
There are several other arguments that individuals might raise in
opposition to the twelve-year plan. For instance, critics might argue that
71. See Days, supra note 26, at 55 (recognizing that racially segregated classes limit the
likelihood that students of different races will have contact with one another).
72. ARMOR, supra note 49, at 8.
73. LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE
AND THE SCHOOLS 276 (1976) (quoting David Armor, The Evidence on Busing, PUB. INT.,
Summer 1972, at 90, 102).
74. Id. at 265; see also Days, supra note 26, at 57-58 (noting that a number of blacks believe
that ending desegregation orders will increase the involvement of parents and the community in
public schools).
75. Tushnet, supra note 67, at 772.
76. Orfield & Thronson, supra note 28, at 761.
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this proposal contradicts the basic theory upon which it is premised,
because it would require a school system to remain under court supervision
for twelve years, even if the system had complied with its desegregation
order in a shorter period of time. After all, courts have found that some
systems have complied with their orders in as short as five
77 or seven7 8
years. The twelve-year plan, however, does not simply select an arbitrary
number of years during which a school system has to maintain acceptable
racial ratios among students and faculty at each of its schools. Instead, this
proposal is predicated on the assumption that the school system has
substantially harmed all students that it has forced to attend segregated
schools.
Consequently, to remedy this harm, the system should be required to
implement the policies mandated by the desegregation order until all
students who had standing 79 in the desegregation case have a chance to
graduate. This group would include all of the students that were in the
school system the year before it implemented the desegregation plan. Also,
to enable a desegregation order to "overcome the cumulative impact of
generations of unequal opportunity,"8 ° the order must be in place long
enough for one class of students to cycle through the entire public education
system.
Another potential criticism is that the twelve-year plan will not really
reduce litigation costs and has the potential to increase them. This concern
would arise from the fact that during every year of court supervision, the
court has to scrutinize an annual report and make a finding on whether the
district has complied in good faith with the desegregation order.
Community members who oppose the release of the district from court
supervision may use each of these opportunities to oppose a finding of good
faith in an effort to convince the court to restart the twelve-year supervision
period. This potential problem is one of the main reasons that the twelve-
year plan requires courts to develop clear and quantitative standards ex ante
to measure the district's progress. If the numbers clearly show that the
school system is complying with the quantitative indicators developed by
the court, this fact might discourage frivolous litigation. Furthermore,
litigation is expensive, which might dissuade these groups from contesting
the court's findings each year. In addition, one of the main reasons that
litigating unitary status is currently so expensive is that schools have to
77. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 241 (1991) (discussing a 1977 court order
finding compliance with and dissolving the 1972 school desegregation program).
78. United States v. Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336, 1337 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
79. See generally Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (stating that an individual has
standing to litigate a constitutional claim if (1) the individual has suffered an injury, (2) the
defendant caused the injury, and (3) the judicial relief the individual has requested can redress the
injury).
80. Orfield & Thronson, supra note 28, at 760.
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accumulate information from long periods of time-sometimes thirty
years-to show that they have complied with the order. Under the twelve-
year plan, however, the schools would only have to prove their compliance
with regard to one year.
An additional criticism that might be raised concerning the twelve-year
plan is that it potentially gives the judiciary the impossible task of
developing an adequate desegregation plan ex ante. After all, what if the
school system complies with the court order in good faith for twelve years,
but the desegregation plan was simply unsatisfactory from the beginning?
Under the twelve-year plan, the court can only restart the twelve-year time
period if the school system has not been complying with the court order in
good faith. Consequently, these critics would question why the students
within the school system should be punished for the judiciary's
shortcomings. The clearest response to this criticism is that the twelve-year
plan does not expect the judiciary to develop a perfect desegregation plan
from the beginning. The plan allows the court to make modifications to the
desegregation plan throughout the process. Furthermore, it seems highly
unlikely that a court would develop a completely dysfunctional plan even at
the beginning of the twelve-year period. It is much more likely that the
court will develop a plan that requires minor tweaking throughout the
process. Since it is clear that a number of harms result when a school
system remains under a desegregation order for too long, it would be a
mistake to require a school system to remain under court supervision while
the court engages in an unlimited period of trial and error to develop the
perfect plan before starting the twelve-year period of compliance. Instead, it
seems that a twelve-year proposal that allows modification of the
desegregation plan throughout the process is the best solution.
Finally, critics might argue that since there is strong evidence that
school systems often want to remain under court orders, the twelve-year
plan should encompass some measures to prevent school systems from
intentionally failing to comply with the court order during the latter years of
the order so as to restart the twelve-year count. Hopefully, in most cases,
the court would be able to detect this type of behavior, and recognize it as
bad faith noncompliance if the school system had been able to meet the
goals of the desegregation order in past years. One misguided way for
courts to address this concern would be through a deterrence mechanism,
such as imposing monetary sanctions on school systems if they do not
comply in good faith with the court order at any stage in the process. For
example, these school systems could be deemed ineligible for the funds that
the federal and state governments make available to schools under court
orders. This solution is not preferable, however, because the individuals
most harmed by monetary sanctions are the children in the school system.
Therefore, to address this concern, it is important to point out that most
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school systems that would want to remain under court orders are systems
that are deeply committed to the ideal of integrated education that
desegregation orders promote. Thus, it seems unlikely that these systems
would commit egregious actions to violate the order simply to remain
subject to it in the future. Furthermore, it seems that it would be apparent to
the court that the school system is engaging in this type of behavior. As a
result, it appears that the best way for the court to proceed in this situation
is to criticize the system's actions openly, but also to allow the twelve-year
count to continue. While this solution may not seem the ideal way to deal
with this problem, as a policy matter, courts should not make a practice of
allowing systems to succeed in manipulating the process in this manner,
thereby encouraging more systems to engage in unconscionable conduct.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG
SCHOOL SYSTEM
The preceding analysis of the potential criticisms that confront the
twelve-year plan actually provides strong support for the merits of this
proposal. However, to demonstrate better the problems inherent in the
current system and the benefits that the adoption of the twelve-year plan
would create, it is helpful to analyze the experience of a school system that
remained under its court order for an unnecessarily long period of time. The
Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System (CMS) is the perfect example. CMS
received national attention in 1971 when the Supreme Court approved a
plan to use busing to desegregate its schools in the landmark case Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.8' Busing is the most dramatic
step that the courts have approved for school districts to use to desegregate
schools, and CMS was the first system to implement this solution.
However, thirty years after the Court approved the busing plan, CMS
remained under the court order. While the court could have released the
system from supervision many years earlier, the court required CMS to
remain under supervision, thereby harming the system's students and
parents.
A. The 1971 Swann Decision
The Swann litigation began on January 19, 1965, when Julius
Chambers, an attorney representing several African-American families in
Charlotte, North Carolina, filed a lawsuit against the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School Board attacking the Board's failure to fulfill its
desegregation obligations. At the time Chambers filed the lawsuit, 98% of
81. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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Charlotte's African-American students (19,510 out of 20,000) attended all-
African-American schools. Of the 490 pupils who did not attend all-
African-American schools, more than 80% were enrolled at a school that
only had seven white students.
82
District Court Judge James McMillan ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
requiring the school district to develop a plan that would completely
desegregate the system's schools by the fall of 1970.8 When the school
district failed to produce an acceptable remedy, McMillan asked an outside
expert on school administration, Dr. John A. Finger, Jr., to develop a plan
for the court to review.84
The plan Finger developed would change the face of school
desegregation. Finger called for the desegregation of all 105 of the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools by using free transportation to create more
acceptable racial ratios among the schools.85 In a landmark 9-0 decision, the
Burger Court required the school district to implement immediately the
Finger Plan in its entirety, thereby accepting the use of busing as a tool to
desegregate schools.8 6 The school board then diligently implemented the
requirements of the desegregation order, and the district court removed the
case from its active docket on July 11, 1975.87
CMS's success in desegregating its schools gained national recognition.
In 1984, the National Education Association commended Charlotte for
being an example of a city where desegregation was working,88 and
scholars and educators lauded the area as "The City That Made Busing
Work." 89
B. Capacchione Threatens To End the Swann Desegregation Order
In response to the ever-changing demographic patterns of the city, the
school system continued to alter its student-assignment plan to ensure that
all schools had balanced racial ratios. In 1992, CMS modified its school-
assignment plan to include the use of magnet schools. 90 The system
82. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 8 (1986).
83. Id. at 16.
84. Swann, 402 U.S. at 8.
85. SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 18-19; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 9-10 (noting that Finger
deviated from the school board's plan and proposed the use of busing for elementary schools as
well as for junior and senior high schools).
86. Swann, 402 U.S. at 32.
87. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 236 (W.D.N.C. 1999),
affdsub nom. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 335 (4th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
88. SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 192.
89. WILLIAM W.E. ROBINSON, FROM DESEGREGATION TO RESEGREGATION IN THE
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG PUBLIC SCHOOLS: IS BUSING WORTH THE RIDE? 4 (1991).
90. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
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developed this new policy initiative largely to address the racial imbalance
occurring because of the shifts in demographic patterns, which were outside
the school system's control.
However, CMS's development of the magnet schools program
prompted the reopening of the Swann litigation. On September 5, 1997,
William Capacchione filed a complaint against CMS on behalf of his
daughter Cristina, who was denied admission to a magnet school by CMS
because of the school's enforcement of a rigid racial quota system resulting
from the school district's desegregation order.91 Cristina Capacchione was
classified as "non-black" because she is Hispanic and Caucasian. The
school no longer had any spaces available for "non-black students" and,
consequently, refused to give her admission.
92
CMS responded to the Capacchiones' complaint by arguing that its
magnet school admissions program did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. The school system claimed that the program was a remedial
measure that it took to comply with the desegregation requirements issued
under the Swann order. Furthermore, CMS maintained that the admissions
program should remain in place because the system had not yet eliminated
all of the vestiges of Charlotte-Mecklenburg's previous dual school system.
At the same time the school system issued its response to the
Capacchiones' complaint, the original Swann plaintiffs filed to reopen their
lawsuit. They concurred with the school system's assertion that it had not
yet satisfied its requirements under the Swann decision, and they requested
that the district court retain the desegregation order. The district court
consolidated these two cases.
9 3
In determining whether or not CMS had achieved unitary status, the
court examined the progress of the school system with respect to the Green
factors, and found that CMS had complied with the court order "to the
extent practicable. 'g Some of the strongest evidence District Court Judge
Potter cited was the fact that the Swann plaintiffs had not had to file any
motions for further relief since the Court issued the final order in Swann.
Also, the court had not had to "enjoin or sanction CMS for
noncompliance." 95  Furthermore, by continually adjusting student
attendance zones when schools became racially unbalanced due to
demographic shifts and private choices, the court was of the opinion that
CMS had "gone above and beyond what the [Swann] orders required. 96
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 239-40.
94. Id. at 284.
95. Id. at 282.
96. Id.
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The court's ruling that CMS had achieved unitary status dictated its
decision concerning the school district's magnet school admissions policy.
The court used strict scrutiny to analyze whether the use of racial criteria in
student admissions was appropriate, considering whether the program
served a compelling state interest and whether the system had narrowly
tailored it.97 Judge Potter was particularly critical of the fact that the CMS
magnet schools rigidly ensured that they achieved the 40/60 racial balance
by mandating that "slots reserved for one race will not be filled by students
of another race."98 Judge Potter most likely viewed this practice as
analogous to the controversial admissions policy employed by the
University of California at Davis in Regents of the University of Califbrnia
v. Bakke.99 In Bakke, the Supreme Court invalidated the Davis admissions
policy because it reserved spots for minorities for which nonminorities
could not compete. The plaintiffs in Capacchione presented specific
evidence of instances where seats at magnet schools remained vacant at the
beginning of the school year because not enough applicants of the desired
race applied to fill them, even after the school had heavily recruited
members of that race. 100 The court ruled that the magnet school admissions
program was unconstitutional because the system had not narrowly tailored
it to address the inequities created by the previous dual system.
C. Conflicting Fourth Circuit Decisions in Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education
The Swann litigation seemed closed after the district court ruled that the
system had achieved unitary status. However, on November 30, 2000, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a two-to-one decision in Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education that reversed a large part of the
district court's prior ruling in Capacchione.10 1 The majority, consisting of
Judges Motz and King, found that CMS had not achieved unitary status
with regard to student assignment, facilities, transportation, and student
achievement. 102
Furthermore, the court ruled that the system's current magnet school
admissions policy did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it was
97. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Supreme Court defined the strict scrutiny test,
stating that all racial classifications have to serve a compelling state interest and have to be
narrowly tailored to further this intcrcst. 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995).
98. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (quoting CMS's 1992 Student Assignment Plan).
99. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
100. 57 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
101. 233 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc, 269 F.3d 305, 317 (4th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
102. Id. at 266.
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designed to facilitate the system's desegregation plan. 0 3 When considering
the issue of student assignment, the appellate court focused on factors such
as CMS's failure to obey court orders concerning where to construct new
schools. 0 4 The court's main concern was that CMS had constructed the
majority of its new facilities since the Swann ruling in suburban white
communities.' 05
While the court conceded that there was no evidence that the school
system was intentionally trying to recreate a dual system, the court felt that
this action was still suspect under the Swann order, and it remanded this
issue to the district court for reconsideration.10 6 The appellate court also
emphasized its concern that African-American students had more heavily
borne the burden of busing than white students, and that this fact violated
the original court decree.10 7 It used this evidence as proof that the school
system had not done everything it could to eliminate the vestiges of prior
segregation. 
0 8
In addition, the court gave much credence to the fact that the school
board had taken "the remarkable step of admitting its noncompliance with
prior orders in this case."' 0 9 The Capacchione plaintiffs appealed the
decision, and the Fourth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc." ° The
court reviewed the district court's ruling for clear error and found none."'
Consequently, the court ordered the removal of the desegregation order and
returned the schools to the local control of the school board.1 2 In addition,
the court affinned the trial court's ruling that the system could no longer
use race-based quotas when making magnet school assignments.
1 13
D. An Analysis of the Conflicting Decisions
After conducting an analysis of all of the facts from Capacchione and
Belk, it is surprising that the three-judge panel found that the school system
had not complied with the court desegregation order concerning student
assignment, facilities, transportation, and student achievement. The
evidence overwhelmingly indicated that the system had done everything
103. Id. at 276.
104. Id at 255.
105. Id. at 256.
106. Id. at 256-57.
107. Id. at 257. The court found it particularly alarming that currently eighty percent of the
children who ride buses are African Americans. Id. at 263-64.
108. Id. at 257.
109. Id. at 257-58.
110. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 317 (4th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
111. Id. at 335.
112. Id. at 312.
113. Id. at 342-43.
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that it could to achieve its desegregation goal. The district court found that
during the last thirty years "an overwhelming majority... generally, 70%
to 100%" of the schools in the school system have been racially balanced,
and no all-black or all-white schools had existed during this time."
14
Furthermore, at least one study had indicated that CMS had facilitated a
higher amount of racial integration than a number of school systems across
the country had achieved when courts declared that they had attained
unitary status.' 15 In fact, while testifying before the court during the
Capacchione litigation, the superintendent of CMS, Eric Smith, admitted
that he could not specify any further benefit that the school system would
gain from remaining under court supervision. 116
The system's record in terms of school-siting decisions was laudable.
Approximately nine years ago, CMS voluntarily adopted a policy that it
would not construct new schools in areas where black residents did not
constitute at least ten percent of the population. 1 7 Furthermore, the district
court found that for a number of years CMS had worked to combat
imbalances resulting from de facto segregation, even though it had no
obligation to address this problem."
1 8
Moreover, when the court issued the desegregation order in 1969, it
originally found that the African-American schools were not inferior to the
white schools." 9 In addition, during the Capacchione litigation, the
plaintiffs did not present any evidence demonstrating that the school system
implemented any intentionally discriminatory policies concerning facilities
since the court issued the desegregation order.' 20 Consequently, the court's
consideration of the school system's facilities should have been moot.
Finally, with regard to transportation, the original court order only required
the system to provide transportation to all students indiscriminately.12' The
defendants in the Capacchione litigation conceded that the school system
had complied with this requirement.122
It is puzzling why the Fourth Circuit judges in the 2000 Belk decision
ruled that CMS had not complied with the desegregation order and why
CMS fought so hard to remain under court control, insisting that it was at
fault for not having done everything that it could have to comply with the
court desegregation order. After all, from the beginning, CMS was one of
114. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1999),
affidsub nom. Belk, 269 F.3d 305, cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
115. Belk, 269 F.3d at 320. This study was conducted by David Armor, an expert who
testified for the plaintiffs in the Capacchione litigation.
116. 57 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
117. Belk, 269 F.3d at 324.
118. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52.
119. Belk, 269 F.3d at 329.
120. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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the school districts in the South that was least resistant to complying with
Brown.123 It began admitting a small number of black students into its
formerly all-white schools in 1957. In fact, even before the Supreme Court
issued the Swann decision, "no southern city, and only two non-southern
cities, had achieved as much racial mixing in its public schools as had
Charlotte." 1 24 One would expect a school system to bristle at having to
remain under court supervision-especially since the evidence is clear that
CMS has worked very hard to comply with the Swann order.
However, CMS had a special incentive to want to remain under the
court order indefinitely. The Fourth Circuit has made it clear that only
school systems that are under desegregation orders can consider race when
making assignments to magnet schools. 125 As a result, since the court has
lifted the desegregation order, CMS will no longer be able to consider race
when granting admission to magnet schools. Furthermore, the system can
no longer justify its policies as remedying the vestiges of past
discrimination. This realization explains why CMS and some parents
wanted the system to remain under the order, as the Fourth Circuit has
intimated that remedial action could be the only compelling state interest
that legitimates the use of race-based distinctions. 12 6 Consequently, in
theory, strict scrutiny could be "fatal in fact" to any future race-based
assignment policies that CMS may choose to implement since the court has
removed the desegregation order.
E. The Benefits the Twelve-Year Plan Would Have Given to CMS
The experience of CMS clearly demonstrates the four main problems
that school systems experience when courts do not remove desegregation
orders for a prolonged period of time. For thirty years, CMS did not have
the freedom or incentive to adopt creative new assignment plans, which
123. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court required that all school districts
cease segregating their student populations by race. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
124. Douglas, supra note 26, at 1-2.
125. In Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, the Fourth Circuit found that an alternative
kindergarten could not use a weighted lottery system with race-based preferences to determine
admissions. 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999), Similarly, in Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Public Schools, the Fourth Circuit found that the Montgomery County Board of Education could
not deny a student the right to transfer to a magnet school because of his race. 197 F.3d 123 (4th
Cir. 1999).
126. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a government
program requiring contractors to subcontract a certain percentage of their work to minorities was
not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination and was therefore unconstitutional); Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a law school's affirmative action plan was
not designed to remedy past wrongs and was thus unconstitutional).
127. Ironically, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court
"wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 515 U.S.
200, 237 (1995) (citation omitted).
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would address its students' needs more adequately.1 28 Furthermore, as a
result of the Supreme Court's unclear standard of what constitutes unitary
status, CMS recently spent thousands of dollars litigating Capacchione and
Belk that it could have used to fund programs to increase the achievement
level of all of its students. Also, during the entire time that it took to resolve
the legal disputes concerning the desegregation order, the parents and
students in the system remained uncertain about when their student-
assignment plan might change and which school they would attend. 129 In
addition, during the three decades that CMS was under court supervision, it
continually revised its student-assignment plan to address imbalances
caused by changing demographic patterns.' 30 Even more problematic,
because the court did not closely monitor CMS's progress while it was
under the court order, and the court did not recognize that the system had
complied with the court order long before William Capacchione initiated
his lawsuit, the court was actually enabling the school system to engage in
unconstitutional behavior.
In contrast, if the Supreme Court had adopted the twelve-year plan
when it began requiring schools to desegregate, the experience of CMS
would have been very different. Under the twelve-year plan, court
supervision of CMS would have begun with the 1975-1976 school year
131
and would have ended at the close of the 1986-1987 school year. Since
CMS did not start to use magnet schools until 1992, the problem
concerning student assignment to these schools would not have arisen.
Furthermore, the system would have never denied Cristina Capacchione
admission to a magnet school because of her race. In addition, the twelve-
year plan would have prevented the system's unnecessary expenditures on
128. See infra Part V.
129. When Judge Potter found that CMS was unitary in September 1999, he mandated that
the system implement a new student-assignment plan for the 2000-2001 school year. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Sch. Sys., The History of Public Schools in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (Sept. 15,
2002), at http://www.cms.kl2.nc.us/discover/history.asp. The following November, the school
system unveiled a new assignment plan; however, when the Fourth Circuit stayed Judge Potter's
ruling in December, this action meant that the school system was not required to implement the
new plan. Id Then, in June 2000, the Board of Education adopted a new assignment plan for the
2001-2002 school year. This plan had to be discarded in December 2000 after the Fourth Circuit
found that the system was not unitary in some areas. Id. After the Fourth Circuit ruled en banc in
September 2001 that the system was unitary, the system once again launched a new student-
assignment plan that would take effect during the 2002-2003 school year. Id. Yet, since the Belk
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, parents in the school system did not know whether the
new plan would indeed take effect until the Court announced in April 2002 that it would not hear
the case. Id.
130. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 282 (W.D.N.C. 1999),
aftd sub nom. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
131. The exact date that the school system began to implement the court-approved plan is
uncertain; however, the date that the court removed the case from its active docket was July 11,
1975. Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d. at 236. Consequently, I have selected this date as a starting
point.
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litigation fees and the stressful confusion parents and students faced
concerning their future school placements. It also would have eliminated
the majority of the system's activities to adjust assignment plans to combat
de facto desegregation, which school systems under desegregation orders
are not required to address.
Moreover, during the 2000 Belk litigation, the court questioned a
number of the decisions CMS had made while it was under the court order.
For instance, the court was suspicious of the fact that the system had built
"twenty-five of twenty-seven new schools in predominately white suburban
communities. ' , 13 2 While the evidence does not suggest that the system made
these decisions with the intent of placing a greater burden on African-
American students than white students, under the twelve-year plan, the
school system would have had to submit annual reports to the court
explaining its decisions concerning school sitings and other Green factors.
Consequently, the court would have had the opportunity to view these
decisions in the aggregate throughout the time it supervised the system to
determine if there was a pattern demonstrating a segregative intent. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, under the twelve-year plan, the system
would have regained full control of its schools in twelve years, and after the
court removed the order, the system could have focused on concerns that
were more important to parents and students than continuing efforts of
perfecting integration. 1
33
V. RESPONSES TO OTHER CONCERNS THE TWELVE-YEAR PLAN
MAY GENERATE
An examination of the CMS litigation clearly shows how the twelve-
year plan would have prevented the four major problems faced by schools
that remain under desegregation orders too long. It also brings to light
several more concerns individuals may have about the twelve-year plan.
However, a careful analysis of the steps CMS has taken since the court
removed its desegregation order reveals that these concerns are unfounded
and actually support the acceptance of the twelve-year plan.
A. Schools Can Still Continue To Use Busing
One potential concern critics might raise in opposition to the twelve-
year plan is that after twelve years, schools could no longer use busing to
create diversity in their nonmagnet schools even if they still feel that
132. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232, 256 (4th Cir. 2000), rev'd
en banc, 269 F.3d 305, cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
133. See infra Subsection V.B.2.
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diversity is an important goal. In actuality, however, school systems can
still use busing to facilitate this goal even after courts remove their
desegregation orders.
Admittedly, it is unclear whether schools could make assignments to
public nonmagnet schools based on race after the court removes the
desegregation order and still use busing to achieve this objective. However,
Professor John Charles Boger has argued that the use of racial
classifications in making assignments to public elementary and secondary
schools is vastly different from the use of racial classifications that the
courts have prohibited in cases like Bakke, Croson, and Hopwood.14 Unlike
employment or higher education, students in nonmagnet public schools are
not competing for a finite number of spaces. Every student who wants the
benefit of a public education in the school system has this opportunity.
However, applicants for admission to a certain university, a specific job, or
a government contract have no guarantee that they will receive that for
which they have applied because there are a limited number of spaces
available.135
The Fourteenth Amendment simply promises individuals that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'1 3 6 Consequently, it
is arguable that "there is no 'federal right' granted to any parent or child
that assures them attendance at any particular public school. For legal
purposes, public schools are deemed equivalent and fungible."
1 37
While this argument is logical, in order to infringe upon students' rights
and bus them to schools that are further from their homes than their
neighborhood school, a compelling state interest must exist.138 At present,
the Supreme Court has not decided whether diversity is a compelling state
interest.' 39 However, regardless of what the Supreme Court decides
concerning this question, a school system could still use busing to create
diversity in its nonmagnet public schools by making student assignments
using wealth as a criterion. The Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a
suspect classification.14
0
134. John Charles Boger, Wilful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the
Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1762-64 (2000).
135. Magnet schools fall into the same category as institutions of higher education because
they have a limited number of spaces available.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
137. Boger, supra note 134, at 1764.
138. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995) (holding that race-based
actions taken by the state must reflect a compelling state interest and that the means to achieve
this goal must be narrowly tailored).
139. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 821 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (noting that the
Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether diversity is a compelling state interest), revd
sub nom- Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Aug.
9, 2002) (No. 02-24 1).
140. San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20-28 (1973).
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Research demonstrates disturbing correlations between race, wealth,
and student achievement. 141 In North Carolina alone, more than half of the
400,000 African-American students in the state's public schools fail
standardized math and reading tests each year, while over eighty percent of
white students consistently pass these tests. 142 Furthermore, studies on a
national level show that "'[t]hree-fifths of all high poverty schools in the
U.S. have majorities of black and Latino students.'' 143 Consequently, it
seems that this plan serves many of the purposes that race-based school-
assignment policies served under the desegregation order. However, the
new plan will probably withstand an attack questioning its constitutionality
because the school board is employing race-neutral criteria in its student-
assignment policies. It appears that a court would employ rational basis
review to analyze the program, as opposed to strict scrutiny, because courts
do not consider wealth a suspect classification. Admittedly, the North
Carolina Supreme Court recently declared in Leandro v. State14 that
education is a fundamental right,1 45 and typically the North Carolina courts
apply strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is at stake. 146 There is still a
strong chance, however, that the courts would not apply strict scrutiny in
this situation.
B. School Systems Will Have More Freedom
Furthermore, the twelve-year plan is actually a better alternative than
the status quo in terms of the future of student-assignment plans because
this plan gives districts more freedom to create diversity and equal
education opportunities. While under court supervision, school districts
have to continue the use of busing to achieve the necessary race-ratios to
comply with their desegregation orders. 147 Busing has always been a
controversial solution and is problematic in a number of ways. Once a court
releases a school system from supervision, however, the system can
continue to use busing to achieve diversity in its nonmagnet schools or it
141. Elizabeth Jean Bower, Answering the Call Wake County's Commitment to Diversity in
Education, 78 N.C. L. REv. 2026, 2040 & n.76 (2000).
142. Id. at 2040-41.
143. Id at 2041 (citing GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YuN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS (1999), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/resegregation99/
resegregation99.html).
144. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
145. Bower, supra note 141, at 2043.
146. id. at 2043 & n.94 (citing Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 378 S.E.2d
780, 782 (N.C. 1989)).
147. While busing was not the only possible method systems could have used to achieve
compulsory integration, the Supreme Court expressed that it was the best way. See Teitelbaum,
supra note 25, at 364 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-30
(1971)).
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can reevaluate whether it wants to continue busing at all. For instance, after
the court removed CMS from supervision, the system opted to implement a
neighborhood schools model for its student-assignment plan, which does
not include busing for long distances.
1. The Problems with Busing
From the beginning of desegregation, the majority of African-American
parents have opposed busing.1 48 They have complained that their children
had to bear much more of the burden to integrate the schools than white
children. In addition, these greater distances were a barrier for parents when
they had to speak with their children's teachers or when they wanted to
attend PTA meetings. Members of the white community also voiced their
opposition to this policy when school systems first implemented it.149 In
addition, it is staggering to discover that school systems spend "hundreds of
thousands or even millions of dollars every year on extra fuel and labor in
order to bus students from one neighborhood to another rather than just a
few miles to the nearest school."
150
Finally, perhaps the best argument against the controversial use of
busing is that, hypothetically, the main benefit of busing is that students of
different races can interact with one another in the educational
environment. The experience of CMS, however, illustrates that this goal
was not necessarily achieved. While the system used busing for thirty years
to create racial diversity in its schools, the desired interaction of students of
different races did not occur because of the school system's use of student
tracking. In 1988, researcher Frye Gaillard questioned whether CMS was
actually resegregating its students within its schools. 15' While busing
ensured that students of different races attended the same school, Gaillard
found that once the students arrived at school, separation by race still
occurred in classes, at lunch, and through extracurricular activities. 52 CMS
divided students into high- and low-ability groups, and the divisions based
on ability levels often showed distinct racial imbalances.'
53
In 1991, William Robinson conducted a study to determine whether
CMS's use of tracking was actually promoting racial resegregation.
54
Studying all of the high schools in the system, Robinson found that "64.5%
148. Mark Nadler, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, in BUSING U.S.A. 310,312 (Nicholaus Mills ed.,
1979); John M. Vickerstaff, Getting off the Bus: Why Many Black Parents Oppose Busing, 27 J.L.
& EDUC. 155, 159 (1998).
149. Nadler, supra note 148, at 310.
150. Vickerstaff, supra note 148, at 160.
151. ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 4.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 5-6.
154. Id. at 8.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112:311
A Better Definition of Unitary Status
of all low track courses were .. racially imbalanced with
disproportionately more black students, and 58.3% of all advanced level
courses were racially imbalanced in favor of other (nonblack) students., 55
In his study, Robinson cited research that demonstrated the negative effects
of tracking on students. Studies have illustrated that low-ability students fall
further behind when they are in classes with all low-level students, but that
they benefit when they are in classes intermixed with students of all ability
levels.1 56 Consequently, Robinson argued that racial tracking in CMS was
hurting African-American students, and CMS should limit its use.
2. The Benefits of a New Neighborhood Schools Plan
Busing has not proven to be as useful in promoting equal opportunities
for students as proponents had hoped, and it has been extremely expensive.
However, school systems under desegregation orders have been forced to
continue this practice indefinitely. In contrast, under the twelve-year plan,
school systems would have the broad freedom to reassess what types of
policies most effectively address the needs of their students after twelve
years and design their assignment plans accordingly.
The actions of CMS after the court removed its desegregation order
illustrate this point. Derrick Bell has observed that even though African-
American students from the inner city attended wealthier schools because
of desegregation, these schools usually funneled the extra money they had
into programs for the high-ability groups that white students predominately
populated. 157 Consequently, CMS has developed a new school-assignment
plan that it will implement at the start of the 2002-2003 school year. This
new plan could potentially address this concern.
Under the new plan, the system has assigned students to a school close
to their homes, known as the student's "home school. 158 In addition, the
system has assigned each student to a "choice zone," which includes
elementary, middle, and high schools located close to the students' homes.
Each choice zone includes three or four high schools. 15 9 Parents have the
opportunity to rank school preferences and can choose from any of the
schools in the system.' 60 The system has guaranteed students admission to
155. Id. at 35. Robinson defined a racially imbalanced course as "[a] course which deviates
from the percentage of black students in the school at large by +/- 20%." Id. at 7.
156. Id. at 45.
157. Derrick Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 125, 136 (Derrick Bell cd., 1980).
158. Telephone Interview with Donna Bell, Executive Director for Planning Services,
Charlotte Mecklenburg School System (Jan. 31, 2002).
159. Id
160. Id.
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their home schools. Parents also have the option of selecting a school
outside of their child's choice zone.
16 1
After the system conducts the initial lottery and makes student
assignments, parents have the opportunity to appeal. 162 The system has
promised to give a preference to the appeals of children who receive free or
reduced lunch and to whom the system has assigned a school where the
proportion of students qualifying for free or reduced lunch is thirty
percentage points or more above the system average. 63
Theoretically, using this new neighborhood schools model, African-
American students can receive more benefits from their school's resources.
To achieve this goal, however, CMS has promised that under the new
student-assignment plan, schools that have higher concentrations of lower
socioeconomic status students will receive additional resources. 164 During
the Capacchione litigation, the issue of whether the system could allocate
supplementary funds to schools arose. Judge Potter ruled that the district
could not make these allocations based on race, but he did not preclude the
schools from distributing these funds based on the low amount of resources
a school currently has available to it. 165 In the past, other school districts
that courts have released from supervision have adopted similar measures.
When Prince George's County in Maryland proposed ending busing and
moving toward a new policy of neighborhood schools, the school board
voted "to spend $172 million to upgrade neighborhood school buildings and
$174 million for educational improvements to ensure that all schools had
equal facilities and resources. ' '1 66
Another important distinction to note between the school system in the
pre-Brown era and the system under the new student-assignment plan is that
students now have the opportunity to transfer to magnet and nonmagnet
schools if they do not like the school to which the system assigns them.
Consequently, since parents will have the opportunity to transfer their
students, this policy will hopefully encourage CMS to equip all of its
schools with adequate resources, so that schools do not become
overcrowded with parents transferring their children.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., Board Resolution 2001 (Apr. 3, 2001), at
http://www.cms.kl2.nc.usstudentassignment/boardresolution2OO1 .asp.
164. Telephone Interview with Donna Bell, supra note 158.
165. Celeste Smith, Speakers Challenge Magnet Moves, Changes for Equity, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Nov. 12, 1999, at 1A; Celeste Smith & Debbie Cenziper, Judge to Schools: No Racial
Assignment, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 1999, at IA.
166. The County Where More Blacks Than Whites Go to College, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC.,
Summer 1995, at 36, 37.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112:311
A Better Definition of Unitary Status
C. The System Can Still Achieve Diversity in Its Magnet Schools
A more challenging concern critics may assert regarding the adoption
of the twelve-year plan is that under its implementation, schools would only
have the opportunity to create diversity in magnet schools for a short period
of time. However, just as schools can still create diversity in nonmagnet
schools after desegregation orders are removed, school systems can also
create diversity within magnet schools by using wealth as one admission
criterion. 16 An analysis of recent events within CMS regarding magnet
school admissions after the court removed the desegregation order
demonstrates the feasibility of this option. Certainly in the opinion of CMS,
the biggest loss that it will face now that the court has released it from
supervision is that it can no longer use racial criteria to create diversity
when making magnet schools admissions decisions. However, CMS has
addressed this concern in its new student-assignment plan by incorporating
wealth-based preferences into its magnet school admissions process.
68
D. The Necessary Return to Local Control
One final argument against the twelve-year plan deals with its limited
duration. More specifically, critics may worry that after the court removes
the desegregation order, many systems may revert to their former
discriminatory practices. However, this concern would exist whether a
system remained under court supervision for twelve years or thirty years.
Furthermore, one must attempt to balance this concern with the idea that
school systems are intended to be under local control.
In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court made clear that "[n]o single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over
the operation of schools.', 16 9 It is clear that the Supreme Court foresaw the
judicial supervision of desegregation as a temporary measure that would
eventually end, and intended for the control of schools to return to local
school boards. Consequently, while it is always a possibility that a school
district could implement segregative or discriminatory policies in the future,
in the long run, it is the responsibility of community activists and voters to
prevent this action from happening. These individuals must accept their
responsibility to ensure that school systems continue to serve the needs of
all of the students within their boundaries regardless of their race.
Moreover, it is important to note that even when a court terminates a
desegregation order, concerned parents can bring new litigation if they feel
167. See supra Section V.A (discussing the correlations between wealth, race, and student
achievement).
168. Telephone Interview with Donna Bell, supra note 158.
169. 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2002]
The Yale Law Journal
that the school system is neglecting the needs of their children. 7 °
Furthermore, another benefit to removing the focus from the classic
desegregation remedies is that it is possible that this policy has achieved its
marginal utility, and parents of African-American children can shift their
focus to address new problems. For example, parents could bring a lawsuit
that attacks the current curriculum and faculty assignments in their schools
if they feel that these components of their children's academic environment
are perpetuating a racial hierarchy by failing to embrace diverse racial and
cultural perspectives.1
7 1
In Knight v. Alabama, concerned parents of African-American children
brought a lawsuit which "challenged the equality of opportunity afforded
African American students in educational institutions that fail to embrace
diverse racial and cultural perspectives."' 72 Some commentators suggest
that concerned parents should seek remedies for "harmful, limiting
schooling practices, such as tracking, early special education designation,
and disciplinary practices that communicate outside status." 73 Parents
could also examine whether racial hierarchies are created by the types of
courses that teachers of different races teach. For instance, these parents
may feel that the fact that white teachers teach most of the advanced
courses in their schools, while minority teachers teach most of the remedial
courses, perpetuates racial hierarchy and racial inferiority. In contrast, while
school systems have been under desegregation orders, it seems that citizens
have operated under the mistaken belief that school systems are not
engaging in discriminatory practices. In actuality, however, school systems
like CMS have still created inequities through mechanisms like tracking.
One benefit of the twelve-year plan is that when school systems are
released from supervision after this specified period of time, parents may
feel a greater responsibility to monitor their schools' polices than they feel
while their schools are operating under court supervision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the twelve-year plan, the court would have released CMS from
court supervision in 1987.174 Instead, the system remained under court
170. See, e.g., United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336, 1346
(N.D. Miss. 1976) (stating that "[i]t seems hardly necessary, in closing this school desegregation
case, to remind anyone that the doors of this federal district court remain open to redress
grievances condemned by the Constitution and laws of the United States").
171. Ware, supra note 34, at 482.
172. Id. (citing Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534 (1 th Cir. 1994)).
173. Id. at 481 n.64.
174. The court removed the Swann litigation from its active docket in 1975. Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 332 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
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supervision for thirty years and fell victim to the four problems that plague
school systems that have to remain under desegregation orders for too long.
This result is unfortunate because the priorities of parents in 2002 are not
the same as the priorities that parents had in 1971. For instance, at present,
"more and more Americans-black and white-discount the importance of
an integrated education., 175 Today, concerned parents of African-American
students are advocating different priorities, such as curbing the unfair
practice of tracking, which disproportionately affects black students, and
encouraging school systems to redirect the large sums of money spent to
bus students away from their neighborhoods to the funding of resources that
they feel the schools need much more.' 76 However, since CMS was under
the desegregation order for thirty years, it lacked the ability to address
many of these redefined priorities because its new policies would most
likely have violated its court order.
While this dilemma is now over for CMS, it still confronts parents and
students in hundreds of school districts. The bell should be tolling for
desegregation orders across the country. Instead, more than 400 school
districts were still under court supervision in the year 2001. An analysis of
the CMS case demonstrates both the benefits this school system will
receive now that it is no longer under the court order and the negative
ramifications that would have occurred if the system had remained under
supervision. It is clear that a more concrete definition of unitary status
would have been helpful. What is unclear is why the Supreme Court has
hesitated to provide a better definition. The reason that the Court did not
elaborate upon the concept of unitary status is not that this concept is not
guaranteed by the Constitution. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment
articulates the constitutional right of equal protection that unitary school
systems promote and dual systems violate.
In addition, the reason that the Court did not more clearly define this
term does not seem to be that it felt that it would overstep its bounds by
providing further clarification. The Court has already demonstrated great
activism when taking control of the school systems, and, in actuality, the
courts determine whether or not a school system has complied with the
desegregation order. Why not provide concrete standards in the beginning
instead of after the system has struggled for years to achieve desegregation?
Another potential explanation for why the Court did not provide clear
guidance is that it did not foresee all the negative ramifications that would
175. Douglas, supra note 26, at 2; see also Days, supra note 26, at 54 (explaining that "black
parents now express support for school board efforts to end desegregation plans that involve
busing, favoring instead a return to neighborhood schools, even though this would result in
increases in the number of virtually all-black schools in the inner city").
176. Jeffrey Rosen, The Lost Promise of School Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, at
A23 (stating that eighty-two percent of African-American parents believe that it is more important
to raise academic standards than to achieve diversity and integration in the nation's schools).
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occur if school systems languished under desegregation orders. For
instance, magnet schools did not exist in 1954 when the Court issued the
Brown decision, so the Court could not have envisioned that systems under
desegregation orders would leave coveted seats at magnet schools unfilled
simply to achieve desired racial ratios. However, while this theory explains
why the Court did not expound upon the concept of unitary status in the
early years of desegregation, this theory does not explain why the Court has
not further clarified this term as school desegregation litigation has evolved.
In fact, the best theory for why the Court has left the concept of unitary
status so vague is that it was wary of creating a one-size-fits-all remedy to
de jure segregation. However, it seems that there are ways to clarify further
the term unitary status without falling into this trap. For instance, while one
may believe that the twelve-year plan does create this type of one-size-fits-
all solution, one must also remember that a school district would still be
working with a district court to create a specialized plan to effectuate
desegregation in its district.
Based on this analysis, it seems that the Supreme Court erred when it
failed to define the concept of unitary status more clearly. Strong reasons
exist to explain why further guidance would have helped. No acceptable
justification appears to exist, however, for why the Court did not further
clarify this term. When the Court ordered schools to desegregate in 1954,
its rationale was that it wanted to ensure that state actors did not use racial
classifications to prevent students from receiving equal educational
opportunities. Ironically, at present, when the courts require school systems
to remain under desegregation orders long after the systems have complied
with these orders, state action is preventing students from receiving equal
educational opportunities. One of the starkest examples of this point is
when school districts will not offer open seats in magnet schools to non-
African-American students because their desegregation order requires them
to satisfy strict racial ratios when making student assignments.
Similarly, school systems currently hide behind desegregation orders
and resegregate students within their schools while failing to address their
students' most pressing needs in other ways. Instead of fighting to ensure
that schools remain under desegregation orders, parents should focus their
litigation efforts on these more pressing problems, which may not violate
desegregation orders but are preventing their students from receiving
adequate educational opportunities.
In reality, it does not appear that the Court is going to offer further
clarification of the term unitary status in the future. It seems that many
school districts will remain under desegregation orders indefinitely until we
finally understand that ending desegregation orders will not erase all of the
progress of the past three decades. Consequently, as the fiftieth anniversary
of the Brown decision quickly approaches, the courts should take a more
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active supervisory role over these desegregation decrees and evaluate why
400 schools are still under court supervision. In addition, the courts should
make a commitment to helping districts determine what more they must
achieve in terms of remedying de jure segregation before the court removes
these desegregation orders, so that school systems can have more freedom
and incentive to address the ever-changing needs of their students.
Furthermore, recognition of the problems inherent in the Supreme
Court's current jurisprudence concerning desegregation orders and of the
merits of a proposal like the twelve-year plan has implications for many
more school districts than the 400 still under supervision. Currently, one of
the most salient issues in education reform is a growing concern about
wealth-based segregation. It has long been recognized that this practice
does not violate a federal constitutional right. 177 A number of state courts,
however, have recently held that their state constitutions recognize
education as a fundamental right, 178 and one state has found that de facto
segregation in public schools is unconstitutional.
179 While the twelve-year
plan is tailored to remedy de jure instead of de facto segregation, many of
the problems that necessitate a solution like the twelve-year plan in the de
jure context also arise in the de facto segregation context. Consequently,
state courts will hopefully learn from the mistakes of federal desegregation
orders and develop remedies that will effectuate self-sustaining change.
177. ARMOR, supra note 49, at 56.
178. John A. Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, in IN PURSUIT
OF A DREAM DEFERRED 21 (John A. Powell et al. eds., 2001).
179. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996). Instead of developing a specific
remedy in Sheff, the court decided that "further judicial intervention should be stayed 'to afford
the General Assembly an opportunity to take appropriate legislative action."' Id at 1290 (citation
omitted).
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